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Abstract
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This paper uses nationally representative survey data from 
Mexico to compare households with savings accounts 
in formal financial institutions to their neighbors who 
do not have such accounts. The survey, which was 
conducted in 2005, contains information on nearly 
5,000 households. The findings show that although 
neighboring banked and unbanked households have 
similar demographic and occupational profiles, the 
former are more educated and have markedly greater 
This paper—a product of the Enterprise Analysis Unit, Finance and Private Sector Development Department—is part of 
a larger effort in the department to study access to financial services. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on 
the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at SSharma1@ifc.org. 
wealth. The median banked household spends 32 percent 
more per capita than the median unbanked household, 
and the median per capita wealth in banked households 
is 88 percent higher than that in unbanked households. 
The findings suggest that education levels, wealth, and 
unobserved household attributes that might be correlated 
with wealth and education play a major role in explaining 
who is banked.    
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Most households in developing countries do not have savings accounts with banks. Using 
estimates based on household surveys conducted in 20 developing countries, Claessens 
(2006) reports that on average only 26% of these households keep savings in formal 
institutions.
1  These data also show that most “unbanked” households do save, suggesting 
considerable use of informal savings instruments which may offer lower interest rates and 
less security than savings in banks. Not opening a bank account could also mean having 
to use more expensive ways of cashing checks and paying bills. 
In this paper, we use data from a nation-wide survey of Mexican households to 
investigate why so few people have savings accounts. We examine, in particular, the view 
that bank usage is low simply because the poorer the household, the more likely it is that 
the cost of a bank account outweighs its benefits. 
The literature on financial access overwhelmingly finds that within a country or a 
region, poorer households are significantly less likely to be banked. For example, over 
35% of low-income households in the US do not have a bank account (Washington 
(2004)). Relative to a national mean of 50%, 73% of low-income households in South 
Africa are without bank accounts (Paulson and McAndrews (1999)). Caskey et al. (2006) 
find that 90% of the urban unbanked in Mexico City and 79% of the urban unbanked in 
the US have below-median income. 
Three main hypotheses have been put forward to explain why people remain 
unbanked. One hypothesis states that the unbanked are those to whom opening a bank 
account does not make economic sense, because relative to the size of their deposits and 
withdrawals, the costs of accounts are too high, or the bank branch is too distant. A 
second hypothesis is that the unbanked are those who do not trust banks, because they 
have had bad experiences with banks, have heard of others who lost their money in banks, 
or simply because they lack financial education. A third hypothesis states that the 
uneducated stay unbanked because they are more comfortable dealing with the informal 
financial sector, even if it is more expensive. 
The most common conjecture in the literature is that households do not use banks 
because they are poor and the costs of banking are too high relative to their small and 
infrequent financial transactions. According to this view, bank usage is low wherever the 
poor are numerous and bank accounts expensive because of poor branch penetration or 
eligibility barriers, and therefore, expanding bank outreach would solve the problem. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, Beck et al. (2007a) use information from banks in 58 
countries to show that physical access, affordability, and eligibility barriers to banking are 
often high enough to potentially exclude a large section of the population from using 
banking services, while Beck et  al. (2007b) present cross-country evidence of a 
correlation between bank penetration and household or firm use of banking services. But 
this evidence alone does not establish causality, since it might reflect a correlation 
between bank access and unobserved factors affecting bank use. Some studies (Pande and 
Burgess (2005), Aportela (1999)) have attempted to get around this problem by looking at 
exogenous sources of regional variation in bank penetration within a country over time. 
                                                      
1This is in sharp contrast to the near universal usage of bank accounts observed in OECD 
countries. Their results too indicate that bank expansion has significant positive effects on poverty, 
and that this effect can be attributed to greater saving and borrowing in banks by poor 
households in previously unbanked areas. 
There is growing evidence, however, that in addition to income and the cost of bank 
services, other household attributes such as wealth and education are strongly correlated 
with their participation in the formal financial sector. Given income, households which do 
not save or borrow using banks tend to be less educated, and to belong to marginalized 
groups. 
For example, in their study of household finance in a Hispanic neighborhood of 
Chicago, Bond and Townsend (1996) find that households with higher income, greater 
English proficiency, house ownership, and use of services outside the neighborhood all 
make more use of banks and less use of loans from friends. Caskey et al. (2006) find that 
60% of the unbanked in Mexico belong to a “marginalized” group, since they work in the 
informal sector, while 90% of the unbanked in the US belong to an immigrant or minority 
group. The comparisons presented in their paper show that besides their poverty, 
unbanked households in the US and Mexico resemble each other in belonging to an 
educationally, economically or socially disadvantaged group. Similarly, Pande et  al. 
(2005) find that only 33% of laborers in rural India had loans in an average year between 
1983-1999, only 23% of which came from formal institutions, and that even within this 
marginalized group, borrowing rates were the lowest among the landless and illiterate. 
Al-Hussainy et  al. (2008) use household survey data from 12 countries to show that 
having a bank account is correlated with not only income but also attributes like literacy 
and home ownership. 
Recent findings from the US (Washington (2004), Caskey (1997)) too support the 
view that income or supply-side factors such as bank branch penetration cannot by 
themselves explain low bank use among the poor and marginalized. Washington (2004) 
finds that “lifeline” US banking legislation requiring banks to offer low-cost accounts is 
associated with a small, lagged increase in the number of minority low-income 
households with a bank account, but seems to have had little impact on the average low-
income household. Using a survey of lower-income urban households in the US, Caskey 
(1997) reports that while 54% of the households did indeed list high bank fees or the 
inconvenience of bank locations as reasons for not having deposit accounts, 53% said 
they had no accounts because they had no savings, 21% because they wanted to keep 
financial record private, and 17% because they were not comfortable dealing with banks. 
The link between education and participation in the financial sector is a growing area of 
research, with early results indicating a causal connection between increases in financial 
knowledge and financial behavior (Martin (2007)). 
Our paper contributes to this literature by looking at the differences between 
households with and without formal savings accounts, using household level data which 
is rich in financial information. This data set was collected through a survey conducted in 
2005 by BANSEFI, a Mexican development bank, and covers nearly 5000 households 
from all parts of the country. A unique feature of the survey design allows us to match 
banked and unbanked households residing in close proximity to each other, a matching 
which lets us compare households that face similar costs and benefits of formal savings 
accounts because of residing in the same neighborhood. In other words, we can take out 
the supply-side variation in savings instruments, including that in the interest rates being offered by deposit-accepting institutions, and focus on the household level determinants 
of being banked. 
We find that while the banked households earn more than the unbanked, this 
difference in income is smaller than that in wealth. The median banked household spends 
only 32% more per capita than the median unbanked household, and as Figure 1 shows, 
the distribution of income is similar across banked and unbanked households, except at 
the right tails. However, the median wealth per capita in banked households is 88% 
higher than that in unbanked households. The latter are also significantly less educated. 
Income alone accounts for little of the variation in bank usage, since it is not uncommon 
for a less educated neighbor of a banked household with similar income and occupation to 
be unbanked. 
The survey reveals that in Mexico only 35% of bank accounts and 2.7% of accounts 
with formal microfinance institutions charge an annual fee. Households’ reports of their 
main reason for not having a bank account (Table 1) fail to support the notion that the 
unbanked are primarily those who are poor and find the transaction costs of bank 
accounts to be too high. Less than 1% of unbanked respondents picked high bank fees or 
initial deposits as their main reason, and only 0.23% complained that the branch is too far 
away. Since the surveyed unbanked are those living close to a banked household, our 
survey cannot measure the extent to which branch distance is a barrier to banking. But 
this survey design also ensures that distance is not a major determinant of the banking 
choice in our sample of households. 
No more than 1% of unbanked respondents said that they did not have a bank account 
because there are too many requirements, the bank staff doesn’t treat the clients well, or 
that they do not know account opening requirements. This contradicts the hypothesis that 
the unbanked are those who are uncomfortable dealing with modern banks. Next, only 2% 
said that they did not have confidence in the bank, which goes against the distrust 
hypothesis. 
The overwhelming majority of unbanked households (89%) put the blame on “not 
having enough money”. Together with our finding that controlling for location, income 
and occupation, banked and unbanked households differ significantly in education and 
wealth, this indicates that low levels of education or saving could be the most important 
reasons for staying unbanked. Given our data, we can only speculate about the causes 
behind the observed asset differences - inherited wealth, income shocks, or behavioral 
traits which affect the propensity to save- and it is also possible that some of the 
correlation between bank accounts and assets arises because having a savings account 
increases savings, as suggested by mental accounting studies (Bertrand et al. (2007)). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 presents the institutional 
background for this study, and section  describes our data. Next, section 3 tabulates 
households’ self-reported reasons for not having bank accounts. In section 4, we compare 
the basic characteristics of banked and unbanked households, after which we describe 
their savings accounts, in section 5. Section 6 compares households by presenting linear 
probability estimates of the correlates of having a bank account, and then in section 7 we 
conclude with a discussion of possible interpretations of our findings. 2  The data 
2.1  An overview of household banking in Mexico 
Only about 10% percent of GDP is held in savings accounts at commercial banks in 
Mexico. Just 15 to 25% of the urban population and 6% of the rural population has a 
savings account in a formal financial institution (Klaehn et al. (2006)). 
Bank branch penetration in Mexico is low compared to that seen in developed 
countries. According to Beck et  al. (2007b), Mexico had only 7.6 bank branches per 
100,000 people, compared to 8.7 in Colombia, 14.6 in Brazil, and 30.9 in the United 
States. Our data indicate that as of 2006, commercial banks covered only 29% of the 
2,443 Mexican municipalities, with an average of more than 10 branches where they have 
presence. Bank branches are heavily concentrated in the richer cities, leading to a neglect 
of much of the lower-income population. 
This low financial sector penetration has been made worse by recurrent currency 
crises, government induced distortions in the rural credit market,
2  and a weak regulatory 
environment. Banks and microfinance institutions have often defaulted on deposits. 
As in many other developing countries, the vacuum that commercial banks left has to 
some extent been filled up by informal microfinance institutions. Since 1950, 
“multiple organizations grew in an organic way out of their own communities, most of 
them in the form of cooperatives. Many of these organizations sprung from a movement 
initiated by priests that tried to imitate the “Desjardins” Model in Canada. This initiative 
spread out of Central Mexico to most of the country, becoming the Mexican 
Confederation of Popular Credit Unions (Confederación Mexicana de Cajas 
Populares)”.
3  
These informal banks were, however, an insecure place to keep money because of a 
lack of regulatory oversight. In 1994, the Mexican Congress modified the law to allow for 
the legal existence of the Savings and Credit Cooperatives, and by 2000 there were more 
than 600 of these organizations, known as “Cajas Populares”. However, these were 
largely unsupervised, which allowed individuals to create “cooperatives” and use deposits 
for their own business; thus depositors often lost their money. 
Since the Cajas had already developed lending relationships with clients, in 2001 the 
Mexican authorities decided to use their existing structure to broaden financial access. 
The government would support and regulate the existing Cajas, formalizing some of them 
either immediately or after some reorganization or mergers, and liquidating those that did 
not make the cut. This law also grouped viable Cajas into federations. Viable Cajas were 
to receive technical assistance and training, and to be incorporated into a technological 
network. Bansefi, a development bank, was entrusted with the task of monitoring and 
coordinating the execution of these goals, and with providing second tier support to the 
sector, including accounting, financial management, and liquidity brokerage. 
Bansefi also owns and operates around 500 branches on its own, of which 176 are 
located in rural areas. While not involved in lending, it has more than 3.4 million saving 
                                                      
2In the 1980’s the Mexican government intervened heavily in the rural credit markets, with 
directed credit at subsidized interest rates, subsidized credit guarantees, and debt forgiveness. 
3Unpublished Bansefi document. accounts. In addition, Bansefi has created a network which electronically links its 
branches with a subset of the Cajas. This network is growing and as of late 2007 
contained 1,432 branches, constituting the third largest banking network in the country, 
the leader in terms of the number of municipalities (710) in which it has a presence. 
Nevertheless, despite the Cajas, the problem of lack of physical access to banking 
services remains acute: 43% of municipalities in Mexico have no commercial bank, 
Bansefi, or registered MFI branch. There is however reason to be optimistic, since 
recently two “niche” banks with 2,536 branches covering 17% of municipalities, Banco 
Azteca and Compartamos, have been profitable in lending to low income households. As 
a result the biggest banks in Mexico, Banamex and Bancomer, are planning to enter this 
market. 
2.2  Our data  
Our data set comes from a survey of banked and unbanked households conducted by 
BANSEFI and the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture. It consists of two parts: the first is a 
representative survey of the households of clients of the Cajas, while the second part 
includes unbanked households, defined as households who do not have a bank account at 
any bank-type institution. The survey is intended to ultimately build a panel of 
households interviewed each year between 2004 and 2008. In this study we focus almost 
exclusively on the 2005 round of the survey. 
The sample was drawn from every part of Mexico. The “treatment” sample (that is, 
the sample of banked households) was selected through a stratified, two-stage sample 
design. First, branches were stratified according to geographical region (North, Center, 
and South) and number of clients (very small, small, medium, and large), and then 
selected from within each strata with probability proportional to the number of clients. 
Finally, about thirty clients’ households were interviewed in every Caja. We take into 
account the stratification and the clustering where appropriate in the analysis that follows. 
The “control” (that is, unbanked) sample was obtained in a less standard manner. For 
every branch selected, the surveying team attempted to interview about thirty households 
that lived nearby and did not have bank account. Therefore, the control sample is 
representative of unbanked households that live near a household with an account in a 
Caja, and should not be be seen as a representative sample of all unbanked households in 
Mexico. 
The original 2004 sample contains 2,975 treatment and 2,793 control households. For 
the 2005 round, Bansefi decided to add some new financial institutions to the sample, 
after making room by dropping six of the original Cajas. Due to these changes and 
natural attrition in the population, the sample size was smaller in 2005. In analyzing the 
data we found that some treatment households did not have financial accounts even in 
2004, and some either opened a first account or closed all accounts between 2004 and 
2005. So we reclassified the treatment status of each household according to whether or 
not they had had an open account in a formal financial institution in the twelve months 
leading up to the 2005 survey. About 12% of the observations were thus reclassified, 
leaving us with a base sample of 2,583 treatment and 2,182 control observations. 
The questionnaire includes detailed information on demographic characteristics, 
expenditures, income, assets, liabilities, and use of formal and informal financial services. 
The sample includes urban and rural households, and detailed information on agricultural activities is available. The questionnaire also includes sections on remittances and 
economic shocks. It also asks unbanked households to list reasons for not having an 
account in a formal financial institution. 
We constructed per-capita expenditure, income, assets, and liabilities aggregates. In a 
few cases, the questions were asked in such a way that we had to exercise judgment in 
order to calculate a sub-aggregate measure such as wage income. We also imputed 
community medians, defined appropriately in each case, to some missing values. For 
almost all the variables, less than one percent of observations had to be imputed through 
community medians. Because of this and the customary arguments for the unreliability of 
income measures, per-capita expenditure is our preferred measure of household welfare. 
Even so, we had some observations with implausibly high or low consumer 
expenditures. Therefore, we also constructed a trimmed sample where we excluded the 
top and bottom 1% of households ranked by per-capita expenditures, leaving us with 
2,531 treatment and 2,140 control observations. This is the sample we use in our analysis 
of household characteristics. However, all of our qualitative conclusions would remain 
unchanged if we used the full sample. 
The survey contained a section on the use of informal financial assets. Unfortunately, 
most of the questions in this section, except those about cash at home, were not asked of 
most treatment households. This makes comparisons of the use of informal financial 
assets such as Tandas
4  or loans from friends between treatment and control households 
unreliable. 
We also use the data to discuss and contrast the usage and the terms of financial 
services between banked and unbanked households. In these comparisons, we leave out 
the missing observations. 
Two features of our data are worth keeping in mind when interpreting our results. 
First, while our data set is representative of the universe of Mexican households that have 
accounts in Cajas, it was not designed to be representative of all Mexican households. 
Our results are thus limited to this sample of banked households and their unbanked 
neighbors. Second, as is also the case with nearly all the studies in this field,
5  we could 
find no plausibly exogenous source of variation in the household attributes which are 
candidates for being determinants of the banking choice. The observed characteristics of 
these households could be endogenous to their financial decision-making if there were 
two-way causation or unobserved correlated attributes. For example, education might be 
correlated with some unobserved belief about banks which affects the household’s 
decision to open a savings account. This limits our ability to draw causal inferences or to 
infer parameters such as the effect of one additional school year on the probability of 
opening an account. 
3   Self-reported reasons for not having bank accounts  
The unbanked households in the BANSEFI survey were asked to pick one out of twelve 
possible reasons for never having had a savings or investment account. The vast majority 
of unbanked households (about 90%) said that they did not have a bank account because 
they had never had the money to do it (Table 1). Not wanting an account came a distant 
                                                      
4Tandas are the Mexican version of informal rotating savings and credit associations. 
5 With some exceptions, such as Pande and Burgess (2005) and Aportela (1999). but clear second in this list, with about 6% of respondents identifying this as their main 
reason. Next, about 2% reported that their main reason was not having confidence in the 
institution. 
These household reports, firstly, fail to support the notion that the unbanked are those 
who are poor, make small transactions and so find the fixed or variable costs of bank 
accounts to be too high. Less than 1% of unbanked respondents picked high bank fees or 
initial deposits as their main reason. Only 0.23% said that the branch is too far away, 
which is not surprising, since by design distance to the bank branch cannot be a major 
source of variation in banked status in our data. 
Secondly, these self-stated reasons contradict the hypothesis that the unbanked are 
those who are uncomfortable dealing with modern banks: no more than 1% of unbanked 
respondents said that they did not have a bank account mainly because there are too many 
requirements, the bank staff doesn’t treat the clients well, or that they do not know 
account opening requirements. Thirdly, only 2% said that they did not have confidence in 
the bank, which runs counter to the distrust hypothesis. 
How do these rankings compare with similar self-reports in other surveys?  Caskey 
et al. (2006) report that in similar surveys done in the US and Mexico City, the most 
frequent answer to this question is indeed some form of the “do not have enough money” 
response. Based on a 1996 survey of lower-income urban households, Caskey (1997) 
reports that 53% of respondents said they had no accounts because they had no savings. 
54% of the households said they were unbanked because of either high bank fees or the 
inconvenience of bank locations, 21% because they wanted to keep financial record 
private, and 17% because they were not comfortable dealing with banks. In a 1998 survey 
of lower-income communities in New York City and Los Angeles in which the answer “I 
do not have enough savings/money” was not included in the set of possible responses, 
three frequent responses were not having the money required to open a bank account, 
high bank fees and not being sure of how to open an account (Caskey et al. (2006)). But 
notably, 58% of respondents chose “none of the reasons listed above”. A 2002 survey of 
households in Mexico City found that the most popular response (49% of households) 
was not having enough money, followed at much lower percentages by high minimum 
balances, low interest rates and lack of trust in banks. 
Although not having enough money consistently shows up as the most frequent 
response in all these surveys, the BANSEFI survey stands out in that unlike in the other 
surveys, no other reason comes close. This is a puzzle, because as we will see shortly, in 
the same BANSEFI survey the average unbanked household is not that much poorer than 
the average banked household. We should note that the phrasing of the response- “I 
haven’t had money to do it”- leaves room for multiple interpretations. Most likely, by 
choosing this answer the respondent is saying that he does not have “enough” savings 
relative to some threshold. This threshold could depend on both economic factors, such as 
the transactions cost of banking, and behavioral or attitudinal factors correlated with 
education. 
4   A comparison of banked and unbanked households  
This section summarizes the characteristics of households surveyed by BANSEFI in 
2005, splitting them into two groups, the banked and the unbanked. Recall that while the 
survey is representative of Mexican households with a savings account in a Caja, every unbanked household was surveyed because of its proximity to a banked household in the 
sample of account holders. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the basic demographic, economic and educational 
attributes of banked and unbanked households. The two groups broadly resembled each 
other in averages of demographic measures, with similar mean household size, number of 
adults, average age of members and likelihood of being headed by a male. However, 
when we look at income, assets and education, it is clear that banked households are on 
average better off than those without bank accounts. The mean per capita annual income 
of unbanked respondents was 15364 pesos (approximately 1382 USD)
6  while that of the 
banked was about 40% higher at 21815 pesos, and the same is true of per capita 
expenditure. The gaps in their assets are wider than those in income: the unbanked on 
average owned per capita assets worth 42347 pesos, while the banked, at 69000 pesos, 
were wealthier by 65%. 
This pattern is brought out more clearly by medians, a more robust measure given the 
highly skewed income and asset distributions that we observe in the data. Table 2 shows 
that the median per capita expenditure of unbanked households was 12129 pesos, while 
that of the banked was about 32% higher at 16019 pesos. The median unbanked 
household reported per capita assets worth 17478 pesos, while the median banked 
household, at 32822 pesos, were wealthier by 88%. Figures 1 and 2, which plot the 
distributions of expenditure and wealth across banked and unbanked households, confirm 
that the gap in wealth is uniformly larger than that in expenditure: comparing the 
cumulative distributions of expenditure (Panel B in Figure 1) with those of wealth (Panel 
B in Figure 2), it is apparent that at any percentile, the difference in wealth is larger than 
that in expenditure. 
Returning to Table 2, the median liability amounts reveal that in both groups, the 
majority of households have no debt. The unbanked had mean liabilities of 520 pesos, 
which was roughly one sixth that of the banked, indicating that even after their higher 
wealth and income are taken into account, the banked are by far the heavier borrowers. 
Table 2 also shows that banked households are more educated than neighboring 
households without savings accounts. 18.5% of unbanked household heads in our survey 
had no schooling, as opposed to 11% of banked household heads, while at the other end 
of the educational range, less than 2% of unbanked households had college education, as 
opposed to nearly 10% of banked household heads. This educational gap exists no matter 
which level of education- whether no school, primary or secondary school, or college- is 
considered, as Panel A of Table 3 reveals. 
Next, Panel B of Table 3 looks at the main occupation of the household head, 
revealing broad similarities in the head’s occupational profile across banked and 
unbanked households. For both groups, the single most common occupation was non-
supervisory wage work, with roughly 40% of heads reporting this, followed by peasant or 
daily farm work (about 15-19%) and self-employment on the street (8%). We do observe 
some occupational differences across banked and unbanked households, but they are 
relatively minor and tend to go in the direction suggested by the lower income and assets 
of households without bank accounts. Unbanked household heads were more likely to be 
peasant or daily farm workers (19% versus 14.5%), and less likely to be self-employed in 
a shop (7% versus 13%), or to be a “boss or entrepreneur” or “independent professional”. 
                                                      
6 1 mexican peso was approximately equal to 0.09 USD in 2005. It is notable that the most obvious difference in occupation is in the likelihood of being 
self-employed in a shop and not on the streets, since shops presumably involve more 
capital than street vending. At the same time, the difference in the likelihood of being 
described as a boss or entrepreneur is small, and much lower than what might be expected 
given the gap in wealth. On the whole, this table indicates that the variation in occupation 
within neighborhoods in which some residents have bank accounts (that is, in the 
BANSEFI sample of neighborhoods) is largely unrelated to having a bank account. 
Next, we look at the composition of household income, asset and expenditure. Panel A 
in Table 4 shows that for both types of respondents, on average the biggest source of 
income (57% of total income) were wages, followed by rental income (20% of income) 
and non-agricultural business income (10% of income). There were no significant 
differences in the income profile of surveyed banked and unbanked households, a pattern 
consistent with and reinforcing the similarity in their occupational profile. 
There is less similarity in their asset composition, however, as Panel B in Table 4 
suggests. On average 58% of the assets of banked households consisted of their home, 
while only 52% of the unbanked respondents’ assets were in this form. This gap, when 
coupled with the wealth gap, implies that banked households own significantly more 
valuable property.
7  This table also shows that only the banked households reported 
keeping a significant fraction of assets (5%) in savings accounts. It would appear that 
both types of households make little use of financial assets, since even for unbanked 
households, for which this variable is measured more precisely, only 1.4% of wealth 
consists of informal financial assets. Consumer durables, on the other hand, were an 
important asset component for both groups of respondents, but less so for banked 
households (32% versus 23% of assets). 
Finally, Panel C gives the average expenditure breakup of the two BANSEFI sub-
samples, with no major differences apparent. Banked respondents reported marginally 
larger fractional spending on services, utilities, rent, education, durables and health 
insurance, and lower spending on food and medicine. 
Like Table 2, Table 5 is also a summary of the basic attributes of the surveyed 
households, but with one addition: column 3 presents statistics for those unbanked 
households who did not list “No money” as their primary reason for not having a savings 
account. These numbers are based on the responses of only 165 households, since most 
unbanked households said that they did not have the money to open an account. 
Nevertheless, comparing all unbanked household responses with those who were 
unbanked for reasons other than money reveals a pattern which could help in interpreting 
the “No money” response. 
First, as expected, the 165 unbanked households that did not put the blame on not 
having enough money did in fact earn and spend more in 2005: their mean per capita 
annual expenditure, at 19700 pesos (approximately 1773 USD), was 21% higher than the 
mean per capita expenditure of all unbanked households, although still lower than the 
21100 pesos spent per capita by banked households. Second, they also appear to be more 
educated than the average unbanked household, with only 9% heads having no school 
education, which is lower than the proportion of unschooled heads in even banked 
                                                      
7This may have some implications for the observed differences in their borrowing behavior, given 
that most formal loans require some form of collateral, and that property is a common form of 
collateral. households. Similarly, they have double the percentage of college educated heads that 
unbanked households have in general. But what is most striking is that this subgroup of 
165 respondents reported nearly 40% higher mean assets (58190 pesos) than the whole 
sample of unbanked households. Thus, excluding unbanked households that chose the 
“No money” response causes mean assets to rise far more than income, suggesting that 
this response means that the household is unbanked because it has too little savings to 
justify opening an account, and not because it earns too little. 
5   Savings accounts: Their costs and benefits  
The BANSEFI survey collected data on savings accounts by asking households to list the 
balances and the institutional type- bank, formal or informal micro-finance institution 
(MFI)- for all their savings accounts, and additionally by asking them about account 
details, such as the interest rate, for up to three each of old and new savings accounts. 
Tables 8 and 9 use these data to describe the savings accounts of the banked households. 
Table 6 first tells us that 13.8% of “banked” respondents had a savings account with a 
bank, 0.9% with an informal MFI, and nearly 89% with a formal MFI. The rest of this 
table summarizes savings accounts after having aggregated across accounts within a 
household. Mean total household balances in savings accounts were 5314 pesos, and most 
of this was held with a formal MFI: on average, a banked household had 4379 pesos in an 
informal MFI, 908 pesos in a bank, and a mere 31 pesos in an informal MFI. 
The remaining statistics in Table 6 are based on the more detailed data from (up to) 
six accounts per household. What do these data reveal about the benefits and costs of 
savings accounts?  The average yield on these savings accounts was 1.5% per annum, and 
the average initial deposit was 2161 pesos, with households on average depositing money 
into an account 13 times and withdrawing it 8 times in a year. Most notably, only 7.3% of 
respondents had an account which required an annual maintenance fee. Among those that 
paid a fee, the median household paid fees of 100 pesos per account, and the mean fee 
was about 600 pesos per account, suggesting that while some households held accounts 
with very high fees, the vast majority paid very little or nothing in annual fees. However, 
54% of households had a savings account which charged a “social participation fee”, 
which is a one-time, non-recurring fee, and of these households the median one paid fees 
of 500 pesos per account. 
Table 7 breaks up account features by type of savings institution by averaging within 
all accounts of a type across all households. Savings accounts in banks had the highest 
mean balances (6600 pesos), followed by those in formal and informal MFIs. Median 
balances, however, were about 1000 pesos across all account types, indicating that most 
account balances are similar irrespective of the institution, although some accounts in 
banks and formal MFIs can be large. Banks and informal MFI’s gave roughly similar 
mean yields of about 1.5% per annum, and accounts with informal MFI’s gave a mean 
yield of 3% per annum, but since this latter figure is based on just 14 responses, we 
should hesitate in concluding from this that informal savings accounts pay more. None of 
the informal MFI accounts charged a fee, however, while 35% of bank account and 2.7% 
of formal MFI accounts did so. Not only were bank accounts more likely to charge an 
annual fee, but they also charged the highest fees, with the median annual fee in banks 
being 187 pesos. 53% of formal MFI accounts, however, charged a “social participation fee”. The 
median value of this fee is 500 pesos, but most households could not state fee amounts, 
and since larger fee amounts are more likely to be recalled, it is likely that the non-
response has biased the estimated fee upwards. In comparison to these fees and to median 
balances, the median initial deposits were 1000 pesos in banks and 200 pesos in formal 
MFIs, suggesting that minimum deposit requirements, if any, are trivial. 
6   How much of the banking status does income explain?   
It is widely argued that low income households are too poor to save and to have an 
account in a financial institution. However, our data suggest that while the level of assets 
does affect the decision to bank, too much weight has been put on poverty as an 
explanation for the low usage of bank accounts. First, as shown in savings accounts 
section, most banks and MFIs do not charge annual fees. Table 7, moreover, shows that 
the median formal MFI receives only 12 deposits and 2 withdrawals in a year, and our 
data also indicate (not shown in table) that the average cost per trip to a financial 
institution is less than two hundredths of 1% of median annual household expenditure, 
while the average time per round-trip is only about 30 minutes. Second, as we show 
below, there are many households in the BANSEFI survey that have the same level of 
income and assets but differ in their banking status. 
The distribution and density of consumption per capita for banked and unbanked 
households are not very different, except at the right tails (Figure 1). This does not rule 
out the possibility that while across localities, the variation in banking status depends on 
the existence or non-existence of branches, within any given locality, it is still driven by 
income. But the same pattern emerges if we remove the locality specific means of income 
before plotting its distributions, indicating that within-locality differences in income too 
are minimal. However, there is substantial variation of banking status even within 
localities, and the regressions that we present below will confirm this. 
We use a linear probability model to estimate the importance of some determinants of 
the ownership of a bank/MFI account, reporting the estimates in Table 8. The explanatory 
variables include per capita consumption expenditure and assets, sex, occupation and 
education of the household head, cash kept at home and the number of adults. 
In none of the regressions can income, as measured by per capita consumption 
expenditure, account for more than 3% of the variance in the decision to have a bank 
account. Although statistically significant, the increase in the probability of having an 
account is small: having 1,000 US dollars more of consumption per capita per year (about 
two-thirds of a standard deviation) increases the probability of having an account by at 
most 5 points (Column 1), relative to a mean of 54. 
Controlling for income, the level of assets has a small but statistically significant 
correlation with having an account: an increase in one standard deviation of US$13,000 is 
associated with a 2.5 points higher likelihood of having an account (Column 2). In 
Column 2, we also consider cash at home, since it may be that for the same level of 
income and assets, the amount of cash to deposit varies greatly across households, and 
households with little cash decide to keep it home.
8  The trade-off between keeping cash 
                                                      
8 The median household claims to have no cash at home, while the mean is 292 pesos, with a 
standard deviation of 1,575 pesos. at home and in a bank account is that of forgoing interest (or safety) versus incurring the 
costs of bank trips. The higher the cash, the more the household loses from forgone 
interest, and the more risky it is too keep it at home in case of theft. We therefore expect a 
threshold of cash at home over which a bank account will be opened, with the associated 
decrease in cash kept at home, leading to a non linear relationship between cash and 
opening an account. This is indeed what we find: having more cash is associated with a 
higher probability of having an account, but as cash levels rise this relationship weakens.
9  
Next, adding education dummies (Column 3) explains an additional 2% of the 
variance. The correlation between education and having a bank account is positive, 
economically large and statistically significant. Having primary school education, for 
instance, increases the probability of having a bank account by 9 points, even when we 
control for consumption and assets. This is equivalent to an increase of USD 2,000 per 
year in per capita consumption.
10  
Note that these results hold when we control for branch fixed effects and dummies for 
the occupation of the household head (column(4)), implying that even if we compare 
households that live in the same location, have the same occupation, level of consumption 
and assets per capita, education is positively correlated with having a bank account.
11  
This correlation can be explained if households with more education are more aware 
of the benefits of having a bank account, or if it is easier for them to obtain and manage 
one. However, given that educational attainment is likely to be correlated with other 
things like cognitive ability and family background, the effect of education may not be 
causal but driven by a third omitted factor. For instance, households with higher 
sophistication or ability may study more and also derive more benefits from having an 
account. New research using US data suggests that while education plays a role in 
financial decision-making, this role involves more than just financial knowledge. For 
example, in a recent study which uses inter-state variation in compulsory education laws 
and data on sibling pairs to study the determinants of financial market participation, Cole 
and Shastry (2007) find evidence that greater cognitive ability and educational attainment 
increase financial participation, while financial literacy alone has no such effect. 
Even our more parameterized regressions in Table 8 (Columns 4 and 5), which 
include demographics, occupation and location fixed effects, can only explain 7% of the 
banking status, 8% of the within-location variation and 9% of across-location variation, 
indicating that idiosyncratic factors at the household level play a quantitatively large role. 
Our interpretation of these regression results is that while low income and wealth do 
affect banking status by decreasing the net benefits of maintaining an account, this story 
is only part of the explanation. Other informational, attitudinal or cognitive attributes, 
such as lack of awareness of the benefits and costs of managing an account, may be 
important. 
                                                      
9 Note that the estimated coefficient on assets per capita is robust to dropping cash at home from 
the set of explanatory variables. 
10The omitted category of education is “comercio”. Comercio is studied after secondary school 
and is a technical career. The data set contains 16% household heads with no primary, 28% with 
some primary, 23% with primary, 3% with some secondary, 15% with secondary, 14% with 
comercio, 7% with college or some college and .3% with graduate studies. 
11Occupation dummies are jointly statistically different from zero, with a p-value of 0.02. There 
are 205 localities/branches in this regression. 7  Conclusion  
Several studies have shown that the unbanked earn less and are more likely to belong to a 
marginalized occupational group than their banked counterparts. Most such studies are 
based on a limited regional sample, and do not account for geographical variation in 
access to banking services, which is significant because poorer and marginalized areas are 
likely to be thinly served by banks. In this paper, where we attempt to control for these 
region effects by comparing proximate banked and unbanked households across a 
nationally representative sample of bank customers, the analysis suggests that income and 
occupational differences can only account for a small part of the variation in the banking 
choices of neighbors. 
The unbanked in Mexico are poorer than their banked neighbors, but the 
corresponding differences in wealth are larger, with education being another important 
correlate of the decision to open a bank account. We also find no evidence of 
prohibitively high bank account costs, and given that in our sample the distribution of 
income across the banked and the unbanked is similar, this suggests that a simple 
transactions cost-benefit calculation alone does not drive banking choice. While we 
cannot claim to measure their causal impact, our findings imply that education and other 
unobserved households traits play a significant role in the decision to use banks. 
These correlations between bank accounts, wealth and education, as also our finding 
that banked households borrow more, should be interpreted in view of the endogeneity of 
the choice to open a bank account. For example, an inference consistent with these 
patterns is that opening an account, higher saving and borrowing are jointly driven by 
unobserved household traits. To the extent that education and related behavioral traits 
drive financial choices, simply getting people to open bank accounts will have little 
impact, while a policy targeting education and these attitudes will increase both bank 
accounts and the welfare-improving potential of access to banks.  References 
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19Table 1: Self-reported reasons for not having a bank account  




I haven't had money to do it  88.84 
I haven't wanted one  6.12 
I don't have confidence in the institution  1.91 
The required initial deposit is too  high  0.75 
Interest rates are too  low  0.65 
Too many requirements  0.51 
The membership fee is too high  0.37 
The fees are too high  0.33 
The branch is too far away  0.23 
I don't know what is required to open an account  0.14 
I haven't had a  permanent job  0.09 
The  staff doesn't treat the clientele  0.05 
 
Note: Based on responses of 2141 unbanked households to the question “What 
is your main reason for not having a bank account?” Table 2: Household Characteristics 




Demographics    
  Household Size  4.3  4.5 
   [0.1]  [0.1] 
  # Adults  2.1  2.4 
   [0.05]  [0.05] 
  Average age  31.4  30.8 
   [.8]  [.6] 
  % with Male Head  78.9  77.9 
      
Income and Assets ( in pesos)    
  Per Capita Income  15364.3  21815.5 
   [646.0]  [901.4] 
  Median 10429.1  14350.8 
      
  Per Capita Expenditure  16255.85  21100.8 
   [504.7]  [522.5] 
  Median 12129.1  16019.0 
      
  Per Capita Assets  42347.1  68999.1 
   [3973.3]  [4747.0] 
Median 17478.1  32822.8   
    
  Per Capita Liabilities  519.9  3238.8 
   [155.4]  [437.6] 
 Median  0  0 
Education    
  % household heads with no 
schooling  18.5 11.4 
  % hh heads with college 
education  1.7 9.5 
      
  N 2140  2531 
 
Note: Estimates of finite-population means from BANSEFI household survey. 
Standard  errors (linearized) in brackets.   
 
 




Unbanked  Banked 
 
 
(%)  (%) 
No School 
 
  18.5  11.4 
Primary School 
 
  53.3  44.9 
Secondary School 
 
20.6  24.1 
Trade 
 
  5.8  10.1 
College and above 
 
  1.7  9.5 
N 
 









   
  Unbanked
    (%) 
Banked 
  (%) 
Boss or entrepreneur 
 
  0.3  0.7 
Independent professional 
 
  0.3  0.7 
Self-employed in street 
 
8.3  8 
Self-employed, in a shop outside home 
 
 
3.2  6.9 
Self-employed, in a shop inside home 
 
  4.1  5.9 
Wage, supervisory 
 




41.1  39.9 
Commission employee 
 
  3.8  3.9 
Peasant or daily farm worker 
 




16.8  15.3 
N 
 
  2,140 2,531 
 
 
 Table 4: Household Income, Asset and Expenditure Composition 
   Unbanked  Banked 
Wage Income  57.7  57.4 
 [1.8]  [1.8] 
Agricultural income  2.4  2.6 
 [.9]  [.4] 
Non-agricultural Business Income  10.6  9.9 
 [1.1]  [.7] 
Welfare Program Income  5.3  5 
 [.5]  [.4] 
Misc. Income  3.6  5.2 
 [.4]  [.4] 
Rental Income  0.06  0.2 
 [  .04]  [.05] 
House Rental Income (Imputed)  20.1  19.4 
A. Income 
 [.9]  [.7] 
Home 52.1  58 
 [2.0]  [1.9] 
Other non-business real estate  3.3  3.9 
 [.9]  [.4] 
Business assets  2.7  3 
 [.5]  [.3] 
Agricultural Business Assets  7.8  5.3 
 [1.4]  [  .9] 
Consumer durables  32.4  23.4 
 [2.2]  [1.7] 
Informal financial assets  1.4  0.7 
 [.3]  [  .1] 
Savings accounts  .  5.3 
B. Assets 
   [.6] 
Food 38.1  33.5 
 [.9]  [.6] 
Household items  15.8  14.2 
  [ .5]  [ .5] 
Services and utilities  10.5  11.8 
 [.4]  [.4] 
Rent 15.3  16.8 
 [.7]  [.6] 
Education 4.8  6.5 
 [.3]  [.4] 
Health Insurance  0.09  0.11 
 [.06]  [.03] 
Medical 3.5  2.8 
 [  .4]  [.2] 
Health 3.6  2.9 
 [  .4]  [.2] 
Consumer Durables   2.6  3.9 
C. Expenditure 
 [.3]  [.2] 
N   2,140 2,531 
 Table 5: Household Characteristics 
(Excluding "No Money" Response) 
 











Demographics      
Household Size  4.3  4.5  3.8 
 [0.1]  [0.1]  [.3] 
# Adults  2.1  2.4  2.3 
 [0.05]  [0.05]  [.3] 
Average age  31.4  30.8  34 
 [.8]  [.6]  [1.5] 
% with Male Head  78.9  77.9  86 
      
Income and Assets      
Per Capita Income  15364.3  21815.5  17315 
 [646.0]  [901.4]  [2053.0] 
      
Per Capita Expenditure  16255.85  21100.8  19678.5 
 [504.7]  [522.5]  [2380.0] 
      
Per Capita Assets  42347.1  68999.1  58190.3 
 [3973.3]  [4747.0] [10552.6] 
      
Per Capita Liabilities  519.9  3238.8  712.7 
  [155.4] [437.6]  [448.8] 
Education      
% household heads with no 
schooling  18.5 11.4  9 
% hh heads with college education 1.7  9.5  4.3 
      
N  2,140 2,531  165 
 
Estimates of finite-population means from BANSEFI  household  survey.  Standard       
errors (linearized) in brackets. Column (3) excludes unbanked households which reported 
“No Money” as the reason for not having a bank account. 
 Table 6: Savings Accounts of Banked Households 
      
 in  Bank    13.8 
% households with a savings account  in Informal MFI    0.89 
  in Formal MFI    88.8 
      
Mean household balances in savings accounts      5314.4 
     [326.5] 
      
 in  Bank    908.5 
     [216.0] 
Mean household balances  in Informal MFI    30.8 
     [11.5] 
  in Formal MFI    4379.4 
     [238.6] 
      
% accounts that require a maintenance fee     7.3 
      
N     2531 
      
Mean  # deposits in a year     13.5 
     [ .4] 
N     2035 
      
Mean  # withdrawals in a year     8.4 
     [.5] 
N     1428 
      
Mean Yield (% p.a.)     1.5 
     [.07] 
N     812 
      
Initial deposits (pesos)      2161 
     [373.6] 
N     532 
      
Mean maintenance fee (if non-zero) in pesos     596.5 
     [292.5] 
Median  fee (if non-zero) in pesos     100 
N     69 
      
% accounts that require social participation fee     54 
Mean social participation fee (if non-zero)     510.2 
     [51.0] 
Median social participation fee (if non-zero)     500 
N     143 
 
The unit of observation is households. Standard errors in brackets. N gives the number of 
non-missing observations  for each variable.  Table 7: Features of Savings Accounts 
     Bank  Informal 
MFI  Formal MFI 
         
Balances   Mean  6603  2943  4325.7 
(pesos)   Median  1000  1100  1000 
   N  355  38  2613 
          
Yield   Mean  1.5  3.8  1.7 
(% p.a.)    Median  0.9  1  0.4 
   N  84  14  924 
          
# Deposits  Mean  19.6  29  13.2 
in a year    Median  12  24  12 
   N  325  35  2341 
          
# Withdrawals  Mean  21.3  4.4  6.3 
in a year    Median  12  1  2 
   N  274  17  1461 
          
Annual Fee?  (%)  35  0  2.7 
  
Fee (pesos)  Mean  837.8    281.3 
(if non-zero)  Median  187    100 
   N  47    33 
          
Social fee?  (%)  0  0  53.2 
          
Social Fee  Mean      517.3 
(if non-zero)  Median      500 
   N      156 
          
Initial deposit  Mean  5467.8  327.4  1192.2 
(pesos)   Median  1000  200  200 
   N  153  19  427 
 
The unit of observation is accounts. Standard errors in brackets. N gives the number of 
non-missing observations  for each variable.  
 Table 8: Correlates of Having a Bank Account 




(1)    (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Consumption per capita  0.053***   
(12.38) 
0.048***   
(10.01) 
0.032***     
(6.24) 
0.031***   
(6.00) 
0.03***    
(7.21) 
Assets per capita    0.002***   
(4.55) 
0.0005***   
(3.82) 




Sex of HH head    0.052***   
(-2.90) 
-0.035**     
(-1.97) 
-0.03         
(-1.40) 
-0.01         
(-0.93) 
Average Household Age     -0.0006     
(-1.41) 
0.0008*       
(1.68) 
0.001*       
(1.91) 
0.001**    
(2.47) 
Number of Adults    0.034***   
(5.63) 
0.03***       
(5.57) 
0.032***   
(5.35) 
0.03***    
(5.65) 
Cash at home    0.087*       
(1.94) 
0.18**         
(2.16) 
0.16*         
(1.95) 
0.18**      
(2.27) 
Cash at home squared      -0.02           
(-1.52) 
-0.02         
(-1.34) 
-0.03**     
(-2.00) 
No primary      -0.18***     
(-5.79) 




Some Primary       -0.09***     
(-3.25) 
-0.09***   
(-3.13) 
-0.12***   
(-4.39) 
Primary       -0.08***    
(-2.94) 
-0.08***   
(-2.86) 
-0.09***   
(-3.23) 
Some Secondary      -0.08***     
(-1.92) 
-0.08*       
(-1.82) 
-0.08*       
(-1.86) 
Secondary      -0.05*         
(-1.76) 
-0.05*       
(-1.75) 
-0.07**     
(-2.34)     
College (some or complete)      0.13***       
(3.66) 
0.13***     
(3.47) 
0.11***    
(3.16) 
Post graduate      0.44***      
(12.61) 
0.26*       
(1.88) 
0.24**      
(1.87) 
Constant  0.44***     
(41.22)      
0.38***     
(14.65) 
0.44***       
(12.61) 
0.41***     
(9.78) 
0.41***    
(10.32) 
Occupation  dummies  No No No  Yes  Yes 
Branch  FE  No No No  No Yes 
R  Squared  0.03 0.04 0.06  0.07 0.07 
Observations  4765 4761 4761  4761 4761 
 
Income, assets and cash  measured in thousands of dollars. t-statistics in parenthesis. *** 
indicates 1% level of significance.  